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The governmenT’s plans for an enhanced role for a reserve 
army, as a complement to a smaller standing army, are radical in 
as much as they are clear breaches from historical precedent, the 
organisational structure of the forces and from the army’s current 
way of doing business. But ultimately this organisational radicalism is 
being proffered to preserve something quite conservative: the desire 
to continue militarily in the way that we have for the last forty or so 
years. The plans and consultations around Future reserves 2020 1 
are not seeking to recast Britain’s role in the world, or to cut the cloth 
of our strategic ambition to meet our fiscal suit, but aim to keep 
the UK as a medium sized power, ‘punching above its weight’, as 
a force able to say ‘yes’ to the interventionist whims of its political 
masters and to be as ‘full-spectrum’ as possible. so, a truly radical 
approach (which may arrive in 2015 in any event) might have turned 
its attentions to these fundamentals, rather than simply muddling 
through, albeit a radical muddling. Whilst this is the context to the 
paper, the content here focuses upon the government’s suggestions 
for the reserve army (and does not consider the naval or air picture 
in any detail) and where the opportunities lay for recasting the 
relationship between society and military on the one hand, and for 
substantial cost-saving synergies in training and accommodation 
exist on the other, whilst also identifying the challenges that face the 
implementation of these reforms.
the political backdrop 
The core motivation of the current British government is the 
eradication of the country’s structural deficit and in finding ways to 
deliver comparable levels of public service on less money than the 
generous funding settlements of the late 1990s and mid-2000s. In 
defence terms, the successive reductions in defence budgets from 
1990 onwards (and from before, in reality) continually raised the 
same questions around how to square the circle of maintaining 
full-spectrum capabilities and sufficient quantities of materiel and 
personnel to secure Britain’s national interests. In the moD’s own 
words: 
  To deliver battle-winning armed Forces, a smaller, more professional 
moD, and a hard headed approach to what we can afford.2 
at the time of the 2010 strategic Defence and security review (and 
the other government spending reviews of that moment) the focus 
fit for the future? the UK government’s 
plans for a reserve army
moved onto the appropriate number of standing forces required to 
deliver the desired amount of security.
The reserve forces have declined from a high in 1990 of 72,500, 
to a low currently of 25,430. This number is made up of the regular 
reserve, which is made up of personnel who have left the standing 
army and remain liable to be recalled in times of exceptional need, 
and the Territorial army which is a volunteer force made up of 
civilians who agree to give up a certain number of days a year to 
be trained in readiness for mobilisation. This declining figure of both 
territorials and reserves combined is set within the wider context of 
the moD reducing the armed Forces by 33,000 (19%) by 2020 (5,500 
rn, 19,500 army, 8,000 raF). The civilian workforce is also being 
reduced by some 32,000 (38%) by 2020. In order to improve the 
impact being made by the reserve army (which is a reworking of the 
territorial and reservist proposition to put this new force on a highly 
trained and more involved state of readiness with the standing army) 
it is the government’s plan to increase their numbers by 2020 from 
the 25,430 now to 38,000 (with 30,000 of these being fully trained). 
To achieve this it has suggested that it will invest £1.8bn in measures 
that are aimed to meet the raw numbers and the quality threshold. 
In reality, it will need to find ways of successfully retaining current 
regulars via the reserve force where they are made redundant from 
the standing army, of incentivising regulars to transition voluntarily 
to the reserve force, of encouraging employers to support reservists, 
and to find new ways of achieving levels of pastoral care over 
potentially diffuse groups. The government says it recognises that 
in making greater use of the reserve it will need to further advance 
its welfare proposition for them, and their families and support 
structures, outside of deployment situations. In short the moD will 
probably need to equalise its arrangements for standing and reserve 
army personnel to accommodate this ‘whole force’ perspective. 
In the reflection period between 2010 and 2012, standing forces 
have rightly been described as being ‘expensive’ and ‘necessary’, 
and whilst much of the focus of the 2010 process was on equipment 
lines and technological capability the intervening two years has 
caused officials and planners to reconsider how best to deliver 
human capability into the field. part of the logic surrounding standing 
forces was applied to hospital beds in the 1990s: unused capacity 
is ‘waste’ and therefore sensible efficiencies can be derived from 
reducing those periods of inactivity. In the case of hospital beds 
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this logic led to the reduction in the spare capacity in wards. What 
is proposed in defence is something analogous: the reduction 
in the numbers of standing forces to 82,000 by the end of the 
decade, and the integration of 30,000 ‘Army Reserves’ in to the 
‘whole force across the complete gamut of military activities. This 
would allow – in fallow periods – the reserve force to be mostly 
engaged in their civilian activities (in addition to maintaining 
military training and expertise levels), whilst in intense periods 
to be utilised operationally. In both cases, the real danger comes 
from needing to manage the peaks of activity where demand for 
resource outstrips the ability to supply (and at sufficient pace). In 
this regard the plans for the reserve army are quite risk acceptant. 
In utilising the reserve army in this way, the government is 
seeking to make a quite radical change in the relationship between 
the military community and wider society, as well as changing the 
way in which the British Army discharges its duties. The proposals 
for the reserve army are far closer to the non-interventionist 
backdrop established by the SDSR, which was seen to have 
been temporarily overturned by Operation Ellamy in Libya. This 
is a more limited military proposition (not by a great magnitude 
of difference though), that is focussing on multi-national and 
multi-agency partnerships and which vests the nation’s defence 
and security not a community of ‘them’ sat behind some razor 
wire, but by a community of ‘us’ doing ordinary jobs with an 
additional role. It is a very astute way of securing some of the 
‘big society’ legacy: binding the country into common defence. 
military effectiveness 
The government mentions several times in its consultation 
paperwork3 that it is vitally important that the reserve army is 
capable of operating fully alongside the standing army and that 
there is not a slither of difference in the capabilities between the 
two: this is embodied by the language used by the Secretary of 
State, Phillip Hammond, of a ‘whole force’. Part of this is based on a 
cliché of the reservists being some kind of ‘Dad’s army’, whilst the 
reality is of a part-time professionalised force which has engaged 
in some serious endeavour during the Iraq and Afghan campaigns. 
It is also based upon a reality that the part-time nature of the roles 
have not been adequate enough to train for particularly difficult 
operational environments. It is clear, though, that the reserve army 
will be asked to perform tasks that extend its contemporary remit, 
which has seen call-ups as being the exception rather than the 
rule. Despite the stipulation of the 1996 Reserve Forces Act which 
gives the impression of more regular call-ups than has been the 
case, and the practice of the Labour government to include a force 
mix of 10% reservists in its operational configurations, the reserves 
have not been easy to use – it was the difficulty of calling out 
reservists under the Reserve Forces Act which undermined and 
ultimately led to the collapse of the Civil Contingency Reaction Forces 
concept introduced in the New Chapter to the Strategic Defence 
Review following 9/11. Under the proposed new system reserve 
army involvement in military activities in the UK and abroad would 
become the norm, and so the way that news is disseminated and 
received will need to adapt to this new reality. So, the reservists 
would be expected to take on some of the standing commitments 
of the army, such as the defence of the Falkland Islands (which 
they do not do at the moment) or to be part of multi-national and 
multi-agency stabilisation teams in unstable environments abroad, 
or to take on tasks such as guarding major events (an example of 
which would have been the summer 2012 London Olympics). Being 
an integrated part of the whole force will place a greater emphasis 
on a systematised and on-going training, as well as regularized 
deployments, rather than the more ad-hoc arrangements that 
exist today. There is also a balance to be struck between using the 
reserve force as a sticking-plaster over gaps in skills or numbers, 
but the typical reservist enjoys a diversified experience and so 
the experience of the reservist in the new whole force must be 
one in which there continues to be a plurality of experiences and 
tasks on offer: the retention of good soldiers depends upon it.
Trying to achieve regularized deployments will be one of the 
significant challenges posed by these new arrangements. The 
models for the deployment of standing forces have become 
substantially stretched since 1997, and the danger would be that if the 
UK retained an active interest in many different unstable regions of 
the world that a reserve army integrated into a ‘whole force’ would in 
effect become a standing army – somewhat defeating the point of 
the distinction in the first place. Similarly, the pledge to give as much 
notice as possible for mobilisation of a reservists is laudable, but 
history tells us that contingencies and the fluidity of the international 
system will often provide for very short notice periods. If this became 
an established pattern it would once again point to the need for an 
enlarged standing army, rather than a blended whole force, but only 
time will tell how this will actually play out. It is, however, a core part 
of the picture as to whether this radical reform will work in practice. 
Another element of the culture of doing the same with less, or 
perhaps doing more with less is the realisation this reinvigoration 
of the reserve army might not be enough is evident from the Chief 
of Defence Staff’s speech to the Royal United Services Institute in 
December 2012 which argued for strategic alliances with militaries in 
the Middle East and Africa as a means by which to multiply the effect 
that a shrunken British military might be able to act as a ‘regional 
ally across all the spectrum’. This is a keen attempt at retaining the 
UK’s position as a medium sized power punching above its weight 
in troubled regions. The core MoD message is though around the 
reserve army for 2020, and with this the switch in the emphasis to 
a greater reliance on reservists and civilian skills to provide security. 
So, within the development of a fully functional reserve army is the 
enlistment of computer technologists to guard and work against 
cyber threats. This move, which was signalled by the Cabinet Office 
on 3 December 2012, has its antecedents in the UK Cyber Security 
Strategy (2011) and the SDSR (2010), but shows a nimble response to 
an ever growing shopping list of diverse and serious threats. 
3.  UK Ministry of Defence, Future Reserves 2020, op. cit; UK Ministry of Defence, FR20 Consultation – What does this mean for Reservists? What is the proposition?, London: Ministry of Defence, 
November 2012; UK Ministry of Defence, Future Reserves 2020 (FR20) – Defence relationship with employers, London: Ministry of Defence, November 2012.
4.  Robert Dover, John Gearson, et al, Harnessing Efficiencies Rethinking Outcomes: The HERO Review, London: Morgan Sindall, http://construction.morgansindall.com/assets/m/s/ms3370_hero_
kcl-final.pdf
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Blended employments
The HERO Review4 into the future of the defence estates and its 
governance, written out of Kings College London by this author, and 
the editor of this journal, John Gearson, in 2011 made the suggestion 
of blended employments as a way of encouraging an enlarged 
reserve force, as a way of widening and reinvigorating the traditional 
notion of an apprenticeship, as a way of improving the post-service 
opportunities for service personnel and to find different blends and 
intensities of skill mixes in the defence community. The proposals put 
forward in the November 2012 Future Reserves 2020 consultation paper 
extends this core idea with some carefully thought-through protections. 
The hindrances to increasing the reserve army and to blending 
employments in this way are many, and involve the disjuncture 
between an employment culture that privileges stable full-time 
employment over the many disruptions that will be felt by employees 
rotating out for training or deployments. The HERO Review suggested – 
for a number of reasons – that the construction and building industries 
were particularly apt for this kind of arrangement due to the inherent 
flexibility of the trade and the absence of barriers for service personnel 
returning from operations. For other industries, and in general, the MoD 
recognises that there will need to be a tailored approach to ‘reflect 
the different opportunities and impacts of reserve service for different 
employers, public and private, large medium and small, as well as by 
sector.’ The MoD also wants to try to balance out the financial incentives 
for being in the standing or reserve armies, so that pro-rata a reservist 
engaged in regular high-end training is paid essentially the same as 
a member of the standing army. This is an important psychological 
barrier of equalising the reward for being a reservist, something that 
is commensurate with the proposed ‘whole force’ approach, which 
includes common readiness and training standards. The government 
also proposes to put in place an anti-discrimination mechanism 
(a voluntary charter), if it is proven to be needed, to remove any 
disincentives to joining the reserve army. The consultation document 
suggests that public sector employers and large private sector 
employers are the best placed to provide the flexibility to see this kind 
of blended employment work well, although in a time of recession it is 
open to question how flexible private employers, who are managing 
(and guarding) budgets of their own, will want to be. The proposal to 
effectively off-set some employer training costs via the defence budget 
will be open to the interpretation of how these off-balance-sheet 
amounts are viewed by the various finance offices: the offer of an 
additional ‘Kite-mark’ is unlikely to yield significant extra revenue and 
might be seen merely a nice corporate social responsibility bauble. The 
anti-discrimination laws as they relate to maternity rights are honoured 
by large employers, but anecdotally there are unofficial ways around 
these for smaller employers in recruitment practices –which could be 
used to discriminate against potential or actual reservists. 
The secondary hindrances, which will only be felt once the policy 
is in operation, concern the ever-growing incidence (of perhaps 
recognition) of mental health problems that result from periods in 
high-intensity operations. The expectation that reservists will be able 
to seamlessly transition back into their civilian lives (even after taking 
the end of operations leave entitlement) seems to run at odds with 
the observable reality of the last twenty years that post-traumatic 
stress episodes (to name but one) are present in many people who 
have experienced war fighting, and is something that can present 
during operations, or as far out as five years after active service.5 
Adequately monitoring, capturing and treating service personnel 
suffering from this range of mental health issues will be an 
essential part of managing the sorts of blended employment being 
contemplated in the November 2012 proposals. To neglect these 
issues will transfer this burden of military service onto the families of 
reservists, their civilian employers and local NHS provision. 
The notion of apprenticeships and with them trades and vocations, 
through-life learning (and it is important to play up the possible 
connections between further and higher education establishments and 
the reserve army) are laudable aspects of the government’s proposed 
plans. Bringing the armed forces closer to the communities they are 
drawn from, and serve, is good for the community and good for the 
armed forces. There is very little to be gained from a bunkered or silo 
mentality, beyond what is necessary for operational cohesion. The 
closer mesh between the two communities will also have positive 
impacts on support, education and employment for all service families, 
and will also help the MoD solve some of its accommodation problems 
as it will regularise service accommodation in the civilian sector. 
conclusion
Future Reserves 2020 is a radical set of proposals that has the 
potential to change the relationship between the armed forces 
(especially the army) and society fundamentally. It brings the 
defence of the realm and national interests far closer to the ordinary 
citizen. In doing so it also opens up some instrumental opportunities 
for the MoD to divest itself of some accommodation costs associated 
with full-time service personnel, to find synergies in training and 
education with civilian sectors, and to make greater indirect use of 
local communities as support structures for active soldiers.
Greater use of reserves in a whole force approach offers the 
potential for a greater number of skills to enter military service, and 
to also make much better use of those able and talented individuals 
who are unable (for whatever reason) to make a commitment to a 
fulltime military career. It may take twenty years’ to see if this initiative 
radically improved the quality of the British army from the position 
of relative weakness of needing to reform in order to respond to yet 
more budgetary pressures. There are, however, a great number of 
challenges in front of these proposals, and most of them exist in the 
minutiae of the implementation: of how to manage army-employer 
relations, of how to manage mobilisations in times of peace and 
conflict, of how to implement complex processes across a diverse 
and complex series of organisations. But it is a worthy initiative, 
particularly in the absence of serious initiatives to recast Britain’s 
military future in line with its interests and financial capabilities. n 
5.  For example see: Harriet J Forbes, Nicola T Fear, Amy Iversen and Christopher Dandeker, The Mental Health of UK Armed Forces Personnel: the impact of Iraq and Afghanistan, RUSI Journal, 
April/May 2011, 156 No 2, pp 14-20.
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